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Abstract— Adversarial examples are firstly investigated in the 
area of computer vision: by adding some carefully designed 
“noise” to the original input image, the perturbed image that 
cannot be distinguished from the original one by human can fool 
a well-trained classifier easily. In recent years, researchers also 
demonstrated that adversarial examples can mislead deep 
reinforcement learning (DRL) agents on playing video games 
using image inputs with similar methods. However, although 
DRL has been more and more popular in the area of intelligent 
transportation systems, there is little research investigating the 
impacts of adversarial attacks on them, especially algorithms 
that do not use images as inputs. In this work, we investigated 
several fast methods to generate adversarial examples to 
significantly degrade the performance of a well-trained DRL- 
based energy management system of an extended range electric 
delivery vehicle. The perturbed inputs are low dimensional state 
representations and close to the original input quantified by 𝑳𝟏, 𝑳𝟐 or 𝑳$ norms. Our work shows that to apply DRL agents on 
real-world transportation systems, adversarial examples in the 
form of cyber-attack should be considered carefully, especially 
for applications that may lead to serious safety issues.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms are used to solve 
sequential decision-making problems without a model of the 
environment or the studied system [1]. If a model is available, 
dynamic programming (DP) can be used to solve the problem 
with an optimal solution [2]. Traditional value-based RL 
algorithms use tables or linear models to represent action-
value functions to solve small-scale problems. The features 
used for the linear models are usually designed by experts with 
strong domain knowledge. In recent years, with the rapid 
development of deep learning in classification and regression 
[3], deep neural networks (NNs) are also introduced into RL 
as function approximators. The NNs can extract useful 
features from raw input images or low dimensional state 
representations without a strong domain knowledge. With 
powerful function approximators, significant upgrades of 
computation hardware as well as various techniques to stable 
the training process, huge successes have been made in 
problems with a much larger scale, like video game playing 
[4][5] and continuous control of complex physical systems [6].  
Many applications in the area of transportation involve a 
process of sequential decision-making, and usually the studied 
transportation systems are difficult to model accurately. 
Consequently, deep RL (DRL) algorithms have been adapted 
to many of them such as traffic light cycle control [7][8], 
autonomous driving [9][10] or energy management systems 
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(EMS) of hybrid vehicles [11][12]. With emerging 
technologies like Vehicle-to-Vehicle and Vehicle-to-Cloud 
communications, DRL will be more widely investigated in the 
area of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS).   
Robustness is one of the most important factors that needs 
to be considered when implementing a new system into the 
transportation area. However, it is found for a well-trained 
NN-based classifier, it is possible to add a small crafted 
perturbation to the original image so that the classifier would 
misclassify the perturbed image, even the difference are not 
discernable by human [13]. In [14], a method called Fast 
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) is introduced to create such 
adversarial examples. It requires small computation resources 
and achieves very good results. In addition, they found one 
adversarial example created for a specific model can also be 
misclassified by other models with different architectures for 
the same task. Further, it is shown that the adversarial 
examples are still effective even they are perceived through 
camera in a real-world problem setting [15]. 
As NNs are also the core components of DRL algorithms, 
researchers have investigated the impact of adversarial 
examples under several simulation settings. In [16], FGSM 
and its two variations with different norm constraints were 
applied to degrade the performance of a DRL agent on playing 
video games using image inputs. Also, adversarial examples 
were compared with random noise under the same simulation 
environment in [17]. It was shown that adversarial examples 
were much more effective in misleading the agent. In [18], a 
more complex and computational expensive approach 
involving a generative model and a planning algorithm was 
introduced to lure the agent to designated target states. In [19], 
a systematic characterization of adversarial attacks was shown. 
They also performed comprehensive experiments on video 
game playing as well as physical system control which uses 
low dimensional state representation. The same physical 
system control simulation environment was also used in [20]. 
They developed adversarial robust policy learning algorithm 
to help the agent perform better at test time under the gap 
between simulation domain and physical domain caused by 
random noise or adversarial noise. 
In this work, we investigate the impacts of adversarial 
examples generated by FGSM related methods on a well-
behaved DRL-based EMS. The EMS is for an extended range 
electric vehicle (EREV) used for package delivery. The 
simulation is based on recorded real-world historical delivery 
trips and an accurate vehicle model. This study is among the 
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first to investigate the adversarial examples on DRL 
algorithms in the area of ITS, where robustness and safety are 
of great importance. Different attacks under different 
assumptions are performed, and Fig.1 illustrates the attack 
process. It is shown that adversarial attacks can degrade the 
performance of the DRL-based EMS significantly, either 
causing the EREV using too much fuel, or leading it running 
out of battery during the delivery trip.  
 
Fig. 1. Illustration of the adversarial attacks. The low dimensional state 
representation 𝑠& provided by the EREV is processed by the adversary before 
sending to the DRL agent on the cloud.  
II. REINFORCEMENT LEARNING BASED ENERGY 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS FOR EREV 
A. Energy Management System Introduction 
The powertrain configuration of the studied EREV is 
shown in Fig. 2. The high-capacity battery is the main energy 
source of the vehicle. The internal combustion engine serves 
as a range-extender which is used to charge the battery through 
the generator according to the EMS. There is no mechanical 
connection between the engine output shaft and the drive shaft; 
the motive power of the vehicle is provided solely by the 
electric motor.  
 
Fig. 2. Powertrain configuration of the EREV 
Ideally, to achieve high fuel efficiencies and reduce on-
road emissions, no fuel should be used to charge the battery if 
the delivery trip is short, which does not exceed the all-electric 
range (AER) of the EREV. For longer trips that require energy 
from the range-extender, the goal is to use as less fuel as 
possible and achieve a target end state of charge (SOC) at the 
end of the trip, which should also be the lowest SOC during 
the whole trip. During the delivery trip, if the real-time 
measured SOC is lower than a calculated reference value, the 
engine will be turned on at a predefined high efficiency speed 
and load condition. The reference value is calculated as: 𝑆𝑂𝐶*+, = 100%× 21 − 0.9 𝑑&𝐿8+&9 , (1) 
where 𝑑& represents the distance the vehicle has traveled, and 𝐿8+&  is the energy-compensated expected trip distance. The 
value of 0.9 comes from the setting that the target end SOC is 
10% in this work as well as in the studied real-world delivery 
fleet. In addition, if 𝑆𝑂𝐶*+, is higher than 60%, it is set to be 
60% to prevent fuel use in very short trips.  
The physical meaning behind 𝑆𝑂𝐶*+, is how much energy 
is expected to be left when the vehicle has traveled for 𝑑& 
given the value of 𝐿8+&. The value of 𝐿8+& can be understood 
intuitively: the higher the value of 𝐿8+&, the more fuel would 
be used to charge the battery as the EMS considers there is a 
long way to go. A good value of 𝐿8+&  can help the vehicle 
achieve high fuel efficiency and always have enough electric 
energy (𝑆𝑂𝐶 > 10%). However, even for the same vehicle 
running on a certain delivery area, trip statistics like distance, 
energy intensity and GPS trajectory vary day-to-day due to 
factors like delivery demand, weather and traffic condition. 
The distribution of distance and energy intensity of the studied 
EREV is shown in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3. Distance and energy intensity distribution of the studied EREV 
To optimize the value of 𝐿8+&  adaptively during ongoing 
delivery trips, a RL-based EMS has been developed. It uses 
real-time information provided by the vehicle and an agent 
trained on historical delivery trips of the vehicle. The updated 𝐿8+& value can be provided to the running vehicle through a 
Vehicle-to-Cloud (V2C) connectivity. The example trips using 
the RL-based EMS are shown in Fig. 4 and 5 [11]. 
 
Fig. 4. Performance of the studied DQN on a 40-mile delivery trip 
 
Fig. 5. Performance of the studied DQN on a 50-mile delivery trip 
B. Reinforcement Learning Algorithms 
This work involves two model-free value-based DRL 
algorithms. In this part, the formulation of the RL problem is 
  
first discussed and then the two DRL algorithms are briefly 
introduced.  
1) Formulation 
The state space consists of the real-time information that is 
available during the delivery trip, including traveled time, 
distance, current SOC, fuel use, GPS position and the current 𝐿8+& setting. Each state in the state space can be represented by 
a vector consisting of seven entries: 𝑠& = [𝑡&*@A+B, 𝑑, 𝑆𝑂𝐶, 𝑓, 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝐿8+&], (2) 
where all the dimensions are scaled to a range of [0,1]. 
The action space is a set of predefined 𝐿8+& changes: 𝑎& ∈ [−10,−5, 0, +5,+10]. (3) 
The environment 𝑝(𝑠&NO|𝑠&, 𝑎&)  is approximated by a 
simplified vehicle model and 52 historical delivery trips of the 
studied vehicle with a distance range of 38 to 57 miles and an 
energy intensity range of 0.91 to 1.44 kWh/miles.  
The reward function is defined as: 𝑟& = 𝑟,𝑡,,& + 𝑟RST𝑡RST,& + 𝑟@,& + 𝑟U. (4) 
The first term penalizes fuel use during the delivery trip. The 
magnitude is proportional to the engine running time with a 
coefficient of −0.001 . The second term penalizes the 
condition of 𝑆𝑂𝐶 < 10% and its magnitude is proportional to 
the time under that condition with a coefficient of −0.060. 
The third term equals to −0.020 if the chosen action is not 0 
and equals to 0 otherwise. It can lead to a more efficient policy 
with less frequent 𝐿8+& changes. The last term is only given at 
the terminal state of the task. It compensates for the negative 
reward caused by the necessary fuel use that keeps the SOC 
always higher than 10% during the trip, and this can only be 
calculated when the trip is finished.    
2) Deep Q-Network 
Deep Q-Network (DQN) is one of the most popular DRL 
methods in recent years and there are many versions of it with 
different incremental improvements [4][5]. The key concept 
for all of them is the action-value function defined as: 
  𝑄Z(𝑠, 𝑎) = 𝐸Z[𝐺&|𝑠& = 𝑠, 𝑎& = 𝑎], (5) 
where 𝐺& is the long-term return with discount factor 𝛾: 𝐺& = 𝑟& + γ𝑟&NO + γ_𝑟&N_ +⋯+ γabOb&𝑟abO. (6) 𝑄Z(𝑠, 𝑎) represents the expected long-term return the agent 
can achieve at the defined environment at timestep 𝑡 if it takes 
action 𝑎 at state 𝑠 and then following policy 𝜋. Intuitively, it 
quantifies how good is action	𝑎 at state 𝑠. 
The core of DQN-based methods is to use NNs as function 
approximators for the optimal action-value function: 𝑄∗(𝑠, 𝑎) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥Z𝑄Z(𝑠, 𝑎), (7) 
which is the highest action-value that can be achieved for all 
state-action pairs under all possible policies. The 
parametrized action-value function 𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎; 𝜓) is also called 
Q-network.  
The policy can be derived by acting greedily with respect 
to 𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎; 𝜓): 
𝜋(𝑠) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥@𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎; 𝜓). (8) 
3) Implicit Quantile Network 
Implicit Quantile Network (IQN) [21] is a distributional 
DRL method. Although it is also a value-based method, 
instead of estimating the action-value directly, it models the 
full return distribution by a NN parametrized by 𝜙. In other 
words, for a give state-action pair, DQN will output the 
expected long-term return as introduced above; the IQN will 
output 𝐾  samples of the long-term return according to the 
implicitly modeled return distribution. The action-value can be 
estimated from the samples: 
𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎; 𝜙) = 𝐸n~p([q,O])[𝑍n(𝑠, 𝑎; 𝜙)] ≈ 1𝐾t𝑍nu(𝑠, 𝑎; 𝜙),vwxO (9) 
where index 𝑖 represents the 𝑖𝑡ℎ sample from the IQN and 𝜏 is 
another input to the IQN, sampled from a uniform 
distribution 𝑈([0,1]) . 𝑍nu(𝑠, 𝑎; 𝜙)  is one sample of the 
possible future return whose expected value equals to the 
action-value.  
III. ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS METHODS 
In this section, several fast methods to generate adversarial 
examples used in this work are introduced. They are 
categorized as white box methods and black box methods 
according to the information known to the attacker.  
A.  White box 
In this condition, it is assumed that the attacker has full 
access to the target agent including network structure, 
parameter weights as well as all the related training details. 
FGSM [14] is used with two variations [16]. 
The main idea of the original FGSM is straightforward. 
Given a loss function 𝐽(𝜃, 𝑥, 𝑦)  where 𝜃  represents the 
weights in the NN-based classifier, 𝑥  represents the input 
image with 𝑑 dimensions and 𝑦 is the true label corresponding 
to 𝑥, a small perturbation is added to the original input 𝑥 so 
that the loss function 𝐽(𝜃, 𝑥, 𝑦) on the perturbed image 𝑥  is 
increased as much as possible. This is achieved by： 𝑥 = 𝑥 + 𝜀𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛[∇𝐽(𝜃, 𝑥, 𝑦)], (10) 
which is derived by linearizing the cost function around the 
current parameters 𝜃 , and solving a 𝐿$  constraint 
optimization problem. For a more detailed and comprehensive 
analysis, we recommend the reader to the original papers 
[14][15].   In addition, the 𝐿O and 𝐿_ norm constrained form is 
also included [16]. For 𝐿O , we maximally perturb the 
dimension 𝑖 that has the highest gradient magnitude: 𝑥 = 𝑥 + 𝜀𝑑 ∙ 𝑒w, (11) 
where 𝑒w is a 𝑑 dimensional vector whose 𝑖𝑡ℎ component is 1 
and 0 otherwise. For 𝐿_ constraint, the perturbed input is: 𝑥 = 𝑥 + 𝜀√𝑑 ∇𝐽(𝜃, 𝑥, 𝑦)‖∇𝐽(𝜃, 𝑥, 𝑦)‖_ . (12) 
In the RL setting, to get the perturbed ?̃?&  from 𝑠& , the 
action-value vector is first calculated from the DRL agent. 
Then, it is transformed into probabilities 𝑦  by the softmax 
function. The label 𝑦 is obtained by replacing the position of 
  
the highest entry in 𝑦  with 1 and 0 otherwise. The loss 𝐽(𝜃, 𝑠&, 𝑦) is then calculated as the cross-entropy between 𝑦 
and 𝑦. Cross-entropy loss is used for classification and in the 
RL setting, it is assumed the target agent performs well and 
what we want is to make it choose another action instead of 
the action based on the original input (“misclassify actions”).   
B. Black box 
1) Finite Difference Method 
As the NN structure and weights are unknown in the black 
box condition, the gradient ∇8𝐽(𝜃, 𝑠&, 𝑦) cannot be calculated 
directly. One method is to estimate it by finite difference (FD) 
method [19]. To apply it on an input with 𝑑 dimensions, it 
requires querying the target agent 2𝑑  times. The 𝑖𝑡ℎ 
component of the estimated gradient ∇8𝐽(𝜃, 𝑠&, 𝑦) is: 𝐽(𝜃, 𝑠& + 𝛿𝑒w, 𝑦) − 𝐽(𝜃, 𝑠& − 𝛿𝑒w, 𝑦)2𝛿 , (13) 𝛿  is a hyperparameter that controls the accuracy. After ∇8𝐽(𝜃, 𝑠&, 𝑦) is calculated, it can be used as ∇8𝐽(𝜃, 𝑠&, 𝑦) . 
This method can be computationally expensive if the input 
dimension is high, for example, an image. In this work, the 
input is a low dimensional state representation so that the 
computation burden is insignificant.  
2) Transferability Property  
If the attacker is not allowed to query the target agent, but 
has access to the training environment, the transferability 
property of adversarial examples can be utilized. It is found 
that adversarial examples generated for one NN often works 
for another NN even the parameter weights and structures are 
different [14][16]. Therefore, the attacker can train an agent 
for the same task using the training environment and generate ?̃?& using its own agent for the unknown target agent.  
  We investigate two cases: transfer across policies and 
transfer across algorithms. For the first case, it is assumed that 
the attacker knows the target agent’s used RL algorithm, NN 
structures and training hyperparameters. For the second case, 
the attacker only has access to the training environment. 
There are plenty of variations of experiments that can be done, 
for example, for the transfer across policies, the attacker may 
only know the RL algorithm used and nothing else. Although 
we only experiment with the described two special cases, it is 
enough to show initial results about the transferability 
property for this problem.  
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS 
We applied the introduced methods on a DQN agent [11] 
on 52 recorded historical delivery trips. Two kinds of random 
noise are used as baselines. The first is random sign noise. A 
value with magnitude 𝜀 is added to each dimension and the 
sign is randomly chosen from positive and negative with equal 
probabilities. The second kind of noise is uniform random 
noise. For each dimension, a value sampled from a uniform 
distribution 𝑈([−𝜀, 𝜀]) is added to the original input.  
The performance of the DQN under these two kinds of 
noise is shown in Fig. 6. For each value of 𝜀 , we run 10 
experiments and get 10 average scores.  
 
Fig. 6. Performance of the DQN under two kinds of random noise with 
different values of 𝜀. The error bars indicate one standard deviation. 
The performance of the DQN under FGSM and its two 
variations are summarized in Fig. 7. First, it can be observed 
that all the three methods are more effective than random noise. 
For the same magnitude of 𝜀, the gradient-based adversarial 
examples can degrade the agent to much worse scores. On the 
other hand, to misguide the agent to a certain low level of 
performance, adversarial examples are much more similar to 
the original inputs. Second, it is obvious the 𝐿O  constrained 
method performs best for most cases. However, one major 
downside is, it uses all budget 𝜀𝑑 to perturb one dimension so 
that it is much easier to be detected.  
 
Fig. 7. Performance of the DQN under FGSM and its two variations 
Fig. 8. compares the performance of FGSM under white 
box condition and its estimation with FD method under black 
box condition. 𝛿 is set to be 0.0001. It can be observed that the 
performance is nearly the same, which indicates the FD 
method can estimate the gradient with high accuracy under 
low dimensional states.  
 
Fig. 8. Performance of the DQN under FGSM and FD method 
  
Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 shows the performance of adversarial 
attacks exploiting the transferability property when the 
attacker cannot query the target agent freely. For the transfer 
across policies case, adversarial examples are generated by a 
DQN with different parameter weights. For the transfer across 
algorithms case, adversarial examples are generated by an IQN 
with different NN structure, hyperparameters and training 
process. Moreover, the IQN is a distributional RL algorithm so 
that the process of calculating the gradient ∇8𝐽(𝜃, 𝑠&, 𝑦)  is 
also different from the standard DQN. It can be shown that 
although all the three methods under these two cases are less 
effective compared with the white box condition, they all 
outperform the random noises in most cases, which indicates 
the transferability property holds true in this EMS problem. 
Also, the results match our expectation: the more we know 
about the target agent, the better the adversarial examples can 
be generated by another agent. The adversarial examples 
generated by the IQN is less effective than a DQN, which is 
more similar to the target agent.   
 
Fig. 9. Transfer across policies. 
 
Fig. 10. Transfer across algorithms. 
To provide some concrete examples of how the DQN 
agent behaves under adversarial attacks, the detailed trip 
information under attacks (Fig. 11 and 12) for the two 
previously shown trips in section II (Fig. 4 and 5) are shown. 
For the shorter trip, although no fuel is needed, 2.65 L fuel is 
consumed under the adversarial attacks. For the longer trip, 
some amount of fuel should be used at the last part of the trip 
to prevent the SOC from being lower than 10%. However, 
under the perturbed states, instead of increasing the value of 𝐿8+&, the DQN agent chooses the opposite actions. 
To further understand the impacts of adversarial examples 
on the DQN agent, we choose state 𝐴 and state 𝐵 from the 
two trips to show the comparison of action-values under 
normal states and perturbed states. In Fig. 13. it is clear that 
the agent will choose the action of decreasing the 𝐿8+& by 10 
if the state information is correct, and the preference of 
actions are also easy to recognize according to the ranking of 
action-values. However, the differences between the action-
values become unclear under the perturbed state. For state 𝐵 
in Fig. 14, it can be shown that if the state information is 
transmitted correctly, the agent will consider that all actions 
will lead to bad results as all the action-values are very low, 
and the action of +10 is the best it can do. Nevertheless, when 
the state is perturbed, the magnitude of the action-values all 
change significantly and the ranking seems random.  
 
Fig. 11. Performance of DQN agent on the recorded trip shown in Fig. 4. 
under adversarial examples generated by 𝐿_ method with 𝜀 = 0.05. 
 
Fig. 12. Performance of DQN agent on the recorded trip shown in Fig. 5. 
under adversarial examples generated by FGSM method with 𝜀 = 0.02. 
 
Fig. 13. Action-values comparison for state 𝐴. The left is for the original state 
and the right is for the perturbed state. 
 
Fig. 14. Action-values comparison for state 𝐵. The left is for the original state 
and the right is for the perturbed state. 
V. DISCUSSION 
It should be emphasized that the results reported from Fig.6 
- Fig.10 are all mean scores over all the 52 trips. Consequently, 
all the used methods to generate adversarial examples are not 
guaranteed to degrade the performance of all the trips. Two 
directions to improve the adversarial attacks are briefly 
discussed below. 
All the introduced and used methods in this work comes 
from the area of CV and ignores the fact that the inputs at each 
time step are correlated temporally in a RL task. Although 
these methods can degrade the performance of the target agent 
  
significantly, more efficient attacks can be achieved if the 
temporal correlation is utilized. To exploit this property, an 
adversarial agent can be trained to generate adversarial 
examples. This can be formulated as a new RL problem which 
considers the environment and the target agent combined as a 
new environment. The goal of the adversarial agent is to 
decrease the cumulated reward of the target agent in the 
original environment. By designing the reward function of the 
new problem, the norm and frequency of attacks can be 
controlled. It is expected that with a well-trained adversarial 
agent, the same level of performance drop can be reached with 
smaller perturbation and less frequent attacks. In [17] and [18], 
two heuristic and easy to implement methods to reduce the 
attack frequency by using the value function have been 
discussed.  
Another downside of the used methods is no target action 
or target state is specified. The goal of the designed attacks is 
to change the action so that it is different from what the target 
agent intends to do. This can be partly addressed by more 
sophisticated and time-consuming methods like combining a 
generative model and a planning algorithm [18]  and iterative 
least-likely class method [15].  
There are at least two directions to build a more robust 
agent against possible adversarial attacks. First, detection 
methods can be utilized to monitor the inputs. Second, 
adversarial training can be applied [20][22].  
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this work, the impacts of adversarial examples 
generated by several fast methods under white box and black 
box conditions on a DRL-based EMS are investigated. It is 
shown that adversarial examples can degrade the performance 
of the target agent significantly on average compared with the 
random noise. As DRL is more and more popular in the area 
of ITS, and robustness is one of the most important factors 
need to be considered when dealing with real-world problems, 
adversarial attacks should be considered carefully especially 
for safety-critical problems.  
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